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Abstract 
Clusters,  as  spatial  concentrations  of  economic  activity,  constitute  an  important  form  of 
coordination  with  significant  repercussions  in  the  configuration  of  firm  and  territorial 
strategies. They are recognized, both by academics and policymakers, as a territorial pattern 
of  economy  yielding  critical  issues  in  terms  of  competitive  advantage,  innovation,  and 
economic growth. Despite that, a rigorous and clear-cut definition of cluster is still far from 
being  reached.  In  the  present  paper,  resorting  to  a  critical  synthesis  of  the  literature  on 
networks and clusters, we propose a unified, encompassing, and less blurred definition of 
cluster. 
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1. Introduction 
Searching  for  a  unified,  sufficiently  comprehensive,  although  not  too  vague  definition  of 
cluster is a challenging task. Since the first explicitly insights from Porter in the 1990s, cluster 
accounts have mushroomed in several directions. This profusion of studies, however, was not 
accompanied by the assumption of a ‘common’ definition of cluster. Rather, such definition 
emerged from several, sometimes conflicting, inputs depending on the analysis undertaken 
(Gordon and McCann, 2000).  
One interesting aspect about clusters is the recurrent way in which authors generically use 
synonymous like agglomeration economies, industrial districts, milieux to define them (Oakey 
et  al.,  2001;  Maskell,  2001;  Tallman  et  al.,  2004).  Several  recent  studies  (Gordon  and 
McCann, 2000; Malmberg and Maskell, 2002; Martin and Sunley, 2003; Maskell and Kebir, 
2005) maintain that this interchangeable use of labels seriously affects concept clarity and, 
consequently, the validity of a cluster theory. For instance, Martin and Sunley (2003: 6) view 
clusters as “a world-wide fad, a sort of academic and policy fashion item”, whose elements 
are conveniently indeterminate so to embrace a broad range of industrial groupings. Aware of 
this pitfall, Maskell and Kebir (2005) subscribe Reich’s (1990: 925) claim that “the cluster 
concept will join those rare terms of public discourse that have gone directly from obscurity 
to meaninglessness without any intervening period of coherence”. 
Clusters involve two key dimensions: spatial proximity and network elements. Networks are 
effective  forms  of  organising  economic  activity  and  producing  relevant  outcomes.  They 
emerge as an appropriate institutional arrangement to face innovation complexity (Imai and 
Baba, 1989), to create/transfer knowledge by its ability of connecting economic agents with 
complementary capabilities; and to face technological demands such as uncertainty and rapid 
pace of change. Indeed, one feature of the innovation process is its complexity, reflected on 
the  fact  that  one  single  organization  does  not  possess  all  the  required  capabilities  to 
successfully innovate and operate (Coombs and Metcalfe, 1998; Dahl and Pedersen, 2003; 
Howells  et  al.,  2003).  Simmie  (2004:  1095)  mentions  innovation  as  “an  internationally 
distributed system of activities” encompassing a broad spectrum of actors. In this context, 
firm interaction and networking emerge as critical (Malmberg, 1997; Hotz-Hart, 2000; Cooke 
and  Morgan,  2003).  It  seems  intuitive  that  if  an  organization  does  not  dominate  all  the 
required  sources  to  innovate  it  will  have  to  access  external  sources,  and  here  networks, 
involving a broader set of actors, seem to fit quite well (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Nelson,   3 
1993). Consequently, the complexity of innovation finds a correspondence in the complex 
configuration of networks, in which several organisations (firms, universities, public research 
agencies, financial system, etc.) collaborate at different degrees (Coombs and Metcalfe, 1998; 
Howells, 1999; Howells and James, 2001). Another feature of innovation is associated with 
its reliance on the capacity to create knowledge through processes of  learning (Lundvall, 
1992; Amin and Wilkinson, 1999; Pinch et al., 2003) and adapting (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). One can divide the effects of such reliance in two strands of interest. First, innovation 
has a spatial root that, to a certain degree, is localised. This element of proximity is related to 
the properties of knowledge that, being partially tacit, is best transmitted locally, sufficiently 
complex to take time to diffuse across space (Jaffe et al., 1993), and highly dependent of the 
specific  social,  economic  and  geographical  context  (Von  Hipple,  1994;  Howells,  2002). 
Although innovation appears to be developed in several localised concentrations of economic 
activity there is some literature (see for example Powell and Grodal, 2004) that stresses the 
role  of  information  and  communication  advancements  in  the  creation  and  sustenance  of 
virtual networks. These networks can be successfully maintained and managed independently 
of geographical affiliation, being the proximity between partner’s solely based on intellectual 
affinities. In this context, Saxenian and Hsu (2001) make reference to the case of technical 
communities, such as Silicon Valley and Hsinchu-Taipei, whose industrial upgrade partially 
relies  on  long-distance  cultural/intellectual  affinities.  Secondly,  innovation  relies  on 
interaction between organisations with diverse (but complementary) capabilities (Lundvall, 
1992;  Richardson,  1972).  Networks  are  considered  to  be  “vehicles  for  producing, 
synthesizing, and distributing ideas” (Powell, 1998: 231). Podolny and Page (1998) also stress 
networks as means of learning, claiming that they promote rapid transfer of information and 
may, inclusively, generate new knowledge, out of the interaction between agents. In addition, 
networks  promote  the  existence  of  trust,  inhibiting  opportunism  and  malfeasance 
(Granovetter, 1985). Gulati (1995) also maintains that past networks may both inform about 
partner’s reputation and work as a form of peer control. 
Generic  trends  such  as  rapid  technological  change  (Coombs  and  Georghiou,  2002), 
decreasing product cycle times, market uncertainties and increasing costs and risks of R&D 
(Howells et al., 2003) promote network activities (Powell, 1990; Saxenian, 1991). As such, 
the importance of networks for economic activity has been receiving scholarly recognition 
with an increasing number of studies on the field. Granovetter (2005) analyses the importance 
of social networks for economic outcomes such as labour market, prices, productivity and   4 
innovation. In a similar, but more focused perspective, Gulati et al. (2000) acknowledge the 
role of networks for firm behaviour and performance.  
Being  networks  a  key  dimension  of  clusters,  and  given  the  difficulty  in  reaching  a 
comprehensive  and  meaningful  concept  of  clusters,  in  the  present  paper  we  undertake  a 
critical  synthesis  of  the  literature  aiming  at  conceptualizing  clusters  through  the  lens  of 
networks. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we introduce the concept of 
networks and summarise some relevant literature in the area. Then, in Section 3, we develop 
the main argument of the investigation – to uncover the elements of networks relevant for the 
conceptual understanding of clusters. Finally, in Conclusions we put forward the main points 
of this critical synthesis. 
2. Concept of networks and its main varieties 
The literature on network forms of organisation is quite extensive. Paraphrasing Podolny and 
Page (1998: 59), network is “any collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange 
relations with one another”. Also Castilla et al. (2000: 219) highlight networks as a “set of 
nodes or actors (persons or organizations) linked by social relationships or ties of a specified 
type”. The social relationships that individuals and/or firms maintain may, thus, originate 
different types of networks. 
In the early 70s, Richardson (1972: 883) developed an argument for what he viewed as a gap 
in the theoretical account of the forms of organising economic activity – “the dense network 
of cooperation and affiliation by which firms are interrelated”. This author admitted his initial 
assumption about an economic landscape merely composed of planned (firms) or spontaneous 
(market) coordination. However, the assumption of an organization of industries based on a 
combination of capabilities, knowledge and skills made Richardson point out the fact that 
some  of  the  industry  activities  –  complementary  in  nature  –  called  for  networks  of 
collaboration (Richardson, 1972). Consequently, networks were interpreted as the appropriate 
form of coordination in the management of different but related activities, at industry level.
1 
                                                 
1 The elements of the debate involving the forms of organising economic activity own their first developments to 
Coase (1937). Overcoming the limitations of the neoclassical accounts about the firm as a mere ‘black box’, he 
stressed the importance of the firm as a governance structure. Moreover, this scholar saw firms and markets as 
alternative forms to organize similar types of transactions. In a valuable overview of networks, Powell (1990) 
identifies the resurgence in interest about this debate in the 1970s, with a strand of literature comprising the 
transaction  costs  theory.  These  accounts  subscribed  Coase’s  (1937)  argument  about  the  importance  of 
organizational forms for economics.   5 
In a different perspective the work by Williamson (1975) – Markets and hierarchies – rather 
than focusing on networks highlights a dichotomous view, between firms and markets, in the 
coordination of economic activity. According to the author, the form of organisation depends 
on  the  nature  of  the  transaction  involved:  if  it  is  uncertain,  frequent  and  with  specific 
investments,  the  transaction  will  preferably  occur  within  a  firm;  if,  on  the  contrary,  the 
exchanges  are  more  simple,  not  so  frequent  and  without  specific  investments,  then  the 
transaction can efficiently be made through the market.  
Later contributions from this leading figure of the transaction cost theory make reference to 
the existence of networks as hybrid forms of coordinating economic activity (Williamson, 
1991). Nevertheless, Podolny and Page (1998) argue that Williamson’s view on networks did 
not actually accounted for networks as independent forms of coordinating economic activity. 
On the contrary, they are inserted on a continuum of alternatives to the pure forms (market 
and  hierarchies),  which  ultimately  will  prevail  when  compared  to  the  hybrid  forms 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991). 
Fierce  opposition  emerged  against  both  the  dichotomy  of  forms  of  organising  economic 
activity (markets vs. hierarchies) and the continuum perspective. For instance, Granovetter 
(1985: 499) criticises Williamson dichotomy by arguing that, according to this perspective, 
there is an overestimation of the “efficacy of hierarchical power”. This author supports the 
idea  of  social  embeddedness  in  economics,  meaning  that  economic  behaviour  and  social 
institutions are intertwined and influenced by ongoing social relations (Granovetter, 1985). 
Therefore, social relations and the corresponding structures (networks) may be more effective 
than firms or markets in guaranteeing order in economic life, that is, promoting trust and 
avoiding malfeasance (Granovetter, 1985). In this sense, interpersonal ties, namely between 
individuals that do not communicate so frequently (weak ties), emerge as powerful sources of 
novelty (Granovetter, 1973). 
Also Powell (1990) contests this dichotomous world of economics, aiming to demonstrate the 
distinctive identity of network forms of organisation. Subscribing Granovetter’s idea (1985), 
that economic activity cannot be insulated from social context and relations, Powell (1990) 
highlights three ways in which Williamson (1975, 1985) theory fails: 1) capturing the rich 
context  of  transactions;  2) providing  an  appropriate pattern  of  economic  development;  3) 
providing  explanations  on  the  role  of  collaboration/networking  as  alternative  coordinating 
mechanism.    6 
Table  1  synthesizes  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  markets,  firms  and  networks 
coordination of economic activity. Powell (1990) argues that the prevalence of networks is 
directly related to three basic reasons, namely the ability to: exchange of know-how; face 
rapidly environment changes, namely technological; and build trust among partners of the 
structure.  
Following this review, Podolny  and Page (1998) produce  a functional characterisation by 
considering  four  main  levels  where  networks  play  an  effective  role:  (i)  learning,  since 
networks constitute a means of gathering and transferring information; (ii) legitimation and 
status;  (iii)  economic  benefits  accruing  from  the  decrease  in  transaction  costs;  (iv)  other 
benefits,  namely  the  reduction  of  uncertainty  and  social  welfare.
2  The  investigation  of 
network failure conditions led Podolny and Page (1998) to conclude that beyond experience 
on  past  networks  (Gulati,  1995),  cultural  and  organizational  affinities  are  critical.  These 
scholars also group the criticisms about the Williamson dichotomy depending on the scholars’ 
background (Podolny and Page, 1998). Indeed, while economists’ views are either under or 
over socialised (Granovetter, 1985) and excessively focused on costs advantages, sociologists 
pursue  a  research  agenda  more  balanced  when  it  comes  to  the  issues  of  social  context, 
relations and its influence in economics. Specifically, they tend to focus on the qualitative 
advantages of networks, such as quality of production (Uzzi, 1997) or capacity to adapt to 
unanticipated contextual changes (Powell, 1990; Kanter, 1991). 
Table 1: Economic forms of coordinating: advantages and disadvantages 
Forms of 
coordination Advantages Disadvantages
Choice, flexibility and opportunity Poor form to learn and transfer know-how
Fast and simple communication
Frequent and complex exchanges imply 
high costs of conducting and monitoring
Prices constitute a simplifying mechanism
Market coordination is non-integrative
Visible hand of management
Hierarchical structure (boundaries, 
authority, formal decisions) well-suited for 
mass production and distribution
Reliability of hierarchical structure
Share risks for activities beyond the scope 
of action of a single entity
Bad conduct or opportunism of partner
Open-ended and relational nature of 
networks promotes ability to exchange and 
learn new skills and knowledge
Networks involve dependency and 
particularism
Fast access to new technologies/markets

















Prices do not capture specificities and 
dynamism of exchange
Weaknesses of the hierarchical features 
when confronted with high demand 







Source: Powell (1990). 
                                                 
2 More recently, building on several empirical studies, Powell and Grodal (2004) consider the following main 
benefits of networking: (i) information diffusion; (ii) share of resources; (iii) access to specialised assets, and (v) 
collective learning.   7 
Networks’  validity  as  an  independent  form  or  organising  economic  activity  is  thus 
intrinsically related to the academic background of the researchers that approach this issue. 
While  sociologists  (Granovetter,  1975,  1985;  Powell,  1990;  Podolny  and  Page,  1998) 
generically  stress  network  qualitative  advantages  as  legitimating  networks  form  of 
coordination, economists (Williamson, 1975, 1981; Hennart, 1988; Zajac and Olsen, 1993) 
tend to focus on costs accountings and view networks as an example of a broader hybrid 
world of forms that combines features from markets and firms.  
Based on the forms of governance and duration of networks, Grabher and Powell (2004) 
distinguish between four categories: 1) project networks; 2), business networks; 3) informal 
networks, and 4) regional networks (cf. Table 2). 
























































Informal networks Regional networks
Short-term Long-term  
Source: Grabher and Powell (2004). 
Additionally, Powell and Grodal (2004) consider three basic criteria to differentiate networks. 
First, and using Granovetter’s (1973) distinction, these scholars mention networks with weak 
and  strong  ties.  According  to  this  criterion,  elements  such  as  the  level  and  frequency  of 
interaction between individuals are essential to determine the type of network and the type of 
information shared (Powell and Grodal, 2004).  
Second, based on Burt’s (1992) contribution, the authors stress networks as bridges and as 
structural holes. In this case, networks may be characterised either by their ability to connect 
with  distant  individuals/firms  or  by  their  ability  to  connect  with  an  entire  new  set  of 
individuals/firms (Powell and Grodal, 2004).  
Third,  networks  may  be  transactional  or  relational  in  nature.  While  the  former  are 
intentionally  generated  to  fulfil  a  specific  task,  the  later  do  not  emerge  from  a  strategic 
purpose  but,  rather,  from  ongoing  social  relationships  (Powell  and  Grodal,  2004).  On  an 
attempt to systematise these issues the authors purpose four main categories (see Table 3).   8 
These modalities of networks fit on more specific typologies, mentioned extensively in the 
literature.  Richardson  (1972),  for  instance,  stresses  four  main  forms  of  networks,  namely 
trading relationships, subcontracting, retail chains and transfer of technology. Powell (1990), 
in turn, illustrated network relevance with examples ranging from sectoral level (networks in 
craft industries, vertical disaggregation), to regional level (industrial districts). 


















Primordial type     Examples: 
Film, construction, ethnic community


















Invisible college type 
Examples: research collaboration, 
information sharing
Strategic type        Examples: 
Networks involving biotech, venture 
capital and pharmaceutical firms
Informal Contractual  
Source: Powell and Grodal (2004: 64). 
Others  like  Freeman  (1991)  broaden  the  modalities  of  strategic  networks  to  include  the 
collaboration forms that can be relevant for innovation (see Table 4). 










Computarised data banks and value-added networks
Others (namely informal networks)  
Source: Freeman (1991: 502). 
Summing up, we contextualised the interest on networks on the broader debate about forms of 
organizing economic activity. The scholars’ background is seen as relevant for their view on 
networks. While sociologists tend to stress network qualitative advantages as legitimating 
networks  form  of  coordination,  economists  tend  to  focus  on  costs  accountings  and  view 
networks as an example of a broader hybrid world of forms that combines features from 
markets and firms. Additionally, the study of networks in a variety of forms and attributes is   9 
due to reflect the different criteria and classifications used, as well as dimensions approached 
– innovation, strategic goals, durability, among others. 
3. Uncovering the elements of networks relevant for the conceptual understanding of 
clusters 
3.1 Defining clusters: how explicit are networks? 
Searching  for  a  unified,  sufficiently  comprehensive,  although  not  too  vague  definition  of 
cluster is a challenging task. Since the first explicitly insights from Porter in the 1990s, cluster 
accounts have mushroomed in several directions. This profusion of studies, however, was not 
accompanied by the assumption of a ‘common’ definition of cluster. Rather, such definition 
emerged from several, sometimes conflicting, inputs depending on the analysis undertaken 
(Gordon  and  McCann,  2000).  In  Table  5  we  group  cluster  definitions  depending  on  the 
dimension they highlight: either spatial proximity or network elements. We argue that the 
inquiry of network elements involved in clusters can contribute to a more rigorous definition 
of the later. The analysis of Table 5 is supported by Maskell’s insights (2001). According to 
this author, the literature on clusters experienced a shift on emphasis from more descriptive 
accounts  (e.g.,  Swann  and  Prevezer,  1996;  Porter,  1998a),  stressing  benefits  from 
agglomeration economies rooted in the Marshallian tradition,
3 to a more dynamic perspective 
(e.g.,  Maskell  and  Lorenzen,  2004;  Dahl  and  Pedersen,  2003),  highlighting  knowledge, 
learning, adaptation, and innovation as critical mechanisms. 
The analysis of the table allows depicting a set of common elements in the cluster notions. A 
first shared element is the geographical dimension of clusters. Such dimension implies some 
degree of spatial proximity, at local, regional or, even national level (OECD, 1999). 
A second common element regards the related nature of activities interacting in the same 
location. Expressions like ‘inter-industry level’ (DeBresson, 1996), ‘related firms’ (Baptista 
and  Swann,  1998;  Maskell,  2001;  Van  Klink  and  De  Langen,  2001),  ‘interconnected 
companies’ (Porter, 1998a), ‘interdependent firms’ (Hertog and Maltha, 1999), ‘symbiotic 
organisations’  (Steinle  and  Schiele,  2002)  and  ‘closely  capabilities’  (Maskell  and  Kebir, 
2005) translate this feature. 
A third generic element in these notions of cluster concerns the interaction among economic 
agents. Drawing on the contributions of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), Porter (1998b) 
                                                 
3 The Marshallian  tradition regards both Marshall’s  work  (1890) and the  works grouped as New Industrial 
Districts (Sabel et al., 1987; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992).   10 
stresses the existence of a double dimension of interaction inside clusters – competition and 
cooperation – labelled as coopetion. Other scholars capture the aspects of cluster interaction 
in the existence of networks (DeBresson, 1996; Hertog and Maltha, 1999) clubs (Steinle and 
Schiele, 2002) and communities (Porter, 1998a, Dahl and Pedersen, 2003). 
Table 5: Clusters definition: several contributions 
Author Cluster definition
Swann and Prevezer 
(1996: 1139)
"groups of firms within one industry based in one geographical area"
Oakey, Kipling and 
Wildgust (2001: 
401)
"cluster and agglomeration will be judged synonymous since they both define 






Regional cluster: "spatial and sectoral concentration of firms"
Maskell (2001: 922)
"referred to as 'locational economies' and embraces those economies that arise 
from geographical agglomeration of related economic activities...the territorial 
configuration most likely to enhance learning processes"
Van Klink and De 
Langen (2001: 450)




"specific spatial configuration of the economy suitable for the creation, transfer, 
and usage of knowledge"
Tallman, Jenkins, 
Henry and Pinch 
(2004: 259)
Regional cluster: "or industrial districts as examples of advantage-generating 
'superfirm' groups inside industries, within each member firms simultaneously 
shares and differentiates sources of competitive advantage"
Maskell and Kebir 
(2005: 1)




Innovative cluster: "not a simple concentration of independent economic agents, 
but display at an inter-industry level, underlying networks of inter-related co-
operating businesses"
Baptista and Swann 
(1998: 525)
Geographical cluster: "strong collection of related companies located in a small 
geographical area, sometimes centred on a strong part of a country's science base"
Porter (1998a: 199)
"geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised suppliers, 
service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions in a 
particular field, linked by communities and complementarities"
Hertog and Maltha 
(1999: 193)
"networks of production of strongly interdependent firms (including specialised 
suppliers), knowledge-producer agents (universities, research institutes), bridging 
institutions (brokers, consultants) and customers related to each other in a value-
adding production chain"
Steinle and Schiele 
(2002: 850)
"localised sectoral agglomerations of symbiotic organisations that can achieve 
superior business performance because of their club-like interaction"
Dahl and Pedersen 
(2003: 7)




































































Beyond these explicit elements derived from Table 5, it is also important to make reference to 
the institutional and cultural context involving the existence of clusters. The social context is 
a relevant factor explaining the economic behaviour and outcomes (Granovetter, 1985, 2005). 
In  this  sense,  some  contributions  point  out  the  relevance  of  a  localised  institutional   11 
infrastructure for the existence of a cluster (Maskell, 2001; Powell et al., 2002; Maskell and 
Lorenzen, 2004). Moreover, the existence of cultural affinities (common language, values, 
academic/intellectual backgrounds) is also important for the sense of identity of the cluster 
(Saxenian, 1991, 1994). 
Summing up, and relying on the contributions above, one can define clusters as, 
Spatial configurations of economic activity, which articulate a wide range of economic agents (firms, 
producers,  suppliers,  service  providers,  universities,  research  institutes,  governmental  agencies, 
financial system, consultants, clients, etc.)
 that interact in proximity. This combination of capabilities, 
under a peculiar institutional frame can be seen as promoting local competitive advantage, innovation 
and growth. 
Spatial proximity, interrelatedness of capabilities/activities, interaction between agents and 
institutional endowment are, therefore, key elements of clusters. 
3.2 Clusters and networks – a two way conceptual relation 
There is a generalized agreement, in the literature, about the networks’ relevance for clusters 
development and success. Specifically, networks are an effective answer to the localisation of 
economic activity, in which clusters are a representative phenomenon.  
However, networks and clusters relationships are not clear-cut. On the one hand, one should 
mention the few signs of communication between the vast, but distinct, bodies of literature
4 
that study either networks or clusters. On the other hand, all the literature does not seem to be 
very clear in terms of the boundaries between network and cluster meanings. 
Once  the  elements  of  network  and  cluster  definitions  were  discussed  it  is  now  time  to 
investigate three main issues concerning their relationship: 1) Accepting that clusters involve 
networks, does the opposite also holds truth?; 2) Assuming that clusters evolve in specific 
geographical  locations,  is  it  possible  to  conceive  networks  merely  in  proximity?;  3)  Is  it 
possible to define a clear boundary between networks and clusters? That is, to define common 
and distinguishing dimensions? 
Breschi and Malerba (2001: 819), reviewing the main issues of a collection of insights about 
clusters,
5 highlight that “learning through networking and by interacting is seen as the crucial 
force pulling firms into clusters and the essential ingredient for the ongoing success of an 
                                                 
4 While networks are an extensively studied concept in sociology, organizational behaviour, and economics, 
clusters seem to be a more appealing label to economic geography and strategic management scholars. 
5 Theoretical contributions are incorporated in a special issue from Industrial and Corporate Change entitled 
“The geography of clustering and innovation”. Peter Maskell, Anna Lee Saxenian, Maryann Feldman, Philip 
Cooke and John Cantwell are among the authors.   12 
innovative cluster”. Therefore, beyond the geographical proximity inherent to clusters, their 
performance relies heavily on thick networks of knowledge. This opinion is also shared by 
Steinle and Schiele (2002), for they view a cluster’s full potential to be exploited through the 
combination of co-location (bringing advantages like lower transport cost) with interaction, 
namely in terms of close membership. 
A wide mentioned case of a successful cluster, which is structured according to networks, is 
Silicon  Valley.  In  fact,  the  region’s  dynamism  and  success  is  attributed  to  “networks  of 
interdependent  yet  autonomous  producers”  (Saxenian,  1991:  430).  More  specifically, 
Saxenian (1991, 1994) maintains that the share of cohesive values, such as reciprocity, mutual 
commitment,  stability,  quality,  etc.,  coupled  with  economic  rationales  (decrease  product 
development times and increase ability to learn) promoted critical long-lasting and trust-based 
interactions between computer system firms and suppliers. More concretely, Granovetter and 
his colleagues stress three basic types of networks, critical for Silicon Valley’s performance: 
(i) networks of access and opportunity related to labour market issues; (ii) networks of power 
and  influence,  namely  from  venture  capitalists  and  lawyers,  whose  role  goes  beyond  the 
conventional ones; (iii) networks of production and innovation to point out the transmission 
of information and the governance mechanism nature (Castilla et al., 2000).  
Notwithstanding the consensus on the relevance of networks for cluster development, Gordon 
and McCann (2000) claim that industrial clusters may exist in the absence of cooperation and, 
therefore,  of  networks.  In  the  context  of  a  pure  agglomeration  model,  firms  enjoy  from 
proximity advantages like specialisation, services or information. Such advantages are free of 
any  cooperation  or  formal  structure,  and  can  be  found  in  cases  such  as  economies  of 
metropolitan areas (Gordon and McCann, 2000). Even so, these scholars suggest two other 
forms of clustering, industrial complex model and a social network model, which imply close 
interaction  and  explicit  networking.  Furthermore,  it  is  acknowledged  that  these  three 
structures are pure and real world examples are, frequently, characterised by a combination of 
features from several models.  
For  all  that  has been  said  it  seems  sensible  to  recognise  that  cluster  success  call  for  the 
existence of networks. However, the literature is far from being clear when it comes to the 
opposite claim – that is, if the existence of networks implies clusters. 
Looking into the literature one cannot find evidence of networking being enough for clusters 
existence and development. A first way of analysing this issue is by investigating the spatial   13 
nature of networks. Underlying this work is the fact that clusters possess a localised nature, 
translated  into  co-presence  of  firms  and  related  economic  agents.  Consequently,  in  the 
hypotheses of networks being a sufficient condition for cluster existence, they would also 
need to develop in proximity or bounded environments. 
Several  authors  have  come  to  conclude  that  networks  are  not  necessarily  bounded  by 
geographical proximity (Echeverri-Carroll and Brennan, 1999). In this context, Gordon and 
McCann (2000: 521) are quite straightforward claiming that “co-location will be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for access” to a network. Others, like Powell and Grodal (2004), 
maintain that ICT developments are considerably improving the interaction between technical 
communities,  and,  therefore,  creating  space  for  the  emergence  of  virtual  networks  of 
innovators, whose proximity is mainly intellectual. In a study about technical communities, 
Saxenian and Hsu (2001) also maintain that knowledge and skills can be exchanged across 
long distances. That is the case of two different communities, Silicon Valley and Hsinchu-
Taipei, networking distantly, through their skilled labour, as a source of industrial upgrading. 
Another line of argument stresses that clusters are not self-contained but, rather, dependent on 
both local and external networking (see, for example, Storper and Venables, 2002; Bathelt et 
al., 2002; Wolfe and Gertler, 2004). As point of fact, beyond the type of knowledge that flows 
in  spatially  local  networks
6  the  cluster  needs  to  maintain  external  connections
7  for  its 
renewing and success. In this context, Staber (1996) argues that networks are supportive of 
these cluster local and global linkages, existing both in spatial proximity and distantly. Some 
phenomena that greatly contribute to this inter-cluster interaction are the spatial patterns of 
critical  assets  like  knowledge  and  innovation,  quite  dispersed  in  nature  (Coombs  and 
Metcalfe, 1998; Amin, 2002; Howells et al., 2003; Simmie, 2004). One case where the need 
for  distant  networking  is  particularly  acute  is  the  high-tech  sectors  like  biotechnology  or 
pharmaceuticals (Powell et al., 2002). As a result concentration – implied in clusters – can co-
exist with dispersion of economic activity. In both patterns of distribution, networks constitute 
a critical mechanism. Sturgeon (2003), for instance, claims that a cluster, such as Silicon 
Valley, is organized through ‘modular production networks’ that manage both local linkages 
and contacts at a global scale. 
                                                 
6  This  local  environment  is  labelled  by  Storper  and  Venables  (2002)  as  ‘local  buzz’  and  regards  regional 
networks. 
7 The connections of the cluster with its external environment concern ‘global pipelines’ and involve strategic 
partnerships (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2002; Storper and Venables, 2002).   14 
Summing up, the spatial pattern of networks could be both concentrated and dispersed and, 
consequently, they would not be sufficient for cluster existence. 
A  second  way  of  analysing  the  lack  of  evidence  regarding  networks  being  sufficient  for 
clusters is by characterising critical elements of the later. As it was argued before, spatial 
proximity,  interrelatedness  of  capabilities/activities,  interaction  between  agents  and 
institutional  endowment  are  key  elements  of  clusters  existence  and  success.  Networking 
emerges as one of the ingredients, and not the only, for the receipt of cluster performance. 
Recently, a study from Giuliani (2005) came to raise concerns about the effective way to 
promote  clusters’  development.  Arguing  for  the  unevenness  and  selectivity  of  cluster 
networks, Giuliani stressed the importance of knowledge base affinities. This finding stands 
in sharp contrast with the tendency in the literature to exacerbate proximity of firms as a 
sufficient  condition  of  cluster  performance.  Consequently,  cluster  benefits  are  maximized 
with intellectual affinities, namely the existence of a common knowledge base, and networks 
need to be responsive to such affinities, locally or distantly. 
According to this evidence, one can conclude that: 
Networks are a necessary but not sufficient condition of clusters existence and performance. Therefore, 
whereas clusters imply the existence of networks, the opposite is not necessarily true. 
The answer to the last question raised at the outset of this section calls for the enquiry about 
the  common  and  distinguishing  features  of  networks and  clusters.  Since  the  concepts  are 
related but different, it is pertinent to suggest some type of boundaries between the two. 
Maskell and Lorenzen (2004) propose a differentiation (see Table 9) between networks and 
clusters that is mainly established by the industry characteristics and the level of relational 
stability. Whereas networks are best suited for stable relations, clusters seem appropriate for 
uncertain industries or ambiguous markets.  
Therefore,  clusters  emerge  as  a  form  of  coordinating  economic  activity  structured  in  a 
territorial  dimension  (Maskell  and  Lorenzen,  2004).  Such  stickiness  is also  related  to  the 
relevance of the social endowment for cluster existence and performance. In this context, 
some scholars (e.g. Maskell, 2001; Powell et al., 2002) stress the importance of local and 
specialised institutions, supportive of the activities developed within the bounded, but porous, 
limits of the cluster. Specifically, Maskell and Lorenzen (2004) summarize four key roles of 
localised institutions: (i) reduce transaction costs; (ii) work as pre-condition of flexibility; (iii) 
contribute to enhance social trust; and (iv) contribute to improve knowledge creation.   15 
Table 2: Networks and clusters comparison 
Networks Clusters
Institutional arrangement Institutional environment
Firms as shareholders Firms as stakeholders
Strong ties Weak ties
Club institutions Social institutions
Trust, sunk costs Social trust, reputation
Codebooks Social codebooks  
Source: Maskell and Lorenzen (2004:pp) 
The  analysis  of  Table  9  allows  realising  the  higher  relational  density  of  clusters  when 
compared  to  networks.  Such  density  is  directly  related  to  geographical  proximity,  a 
phenomenon that does not necessarily occurs in networks, and to the communal social culture 
inherent to such spatially bounded environment (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004).  
Another  distinguishing  feature  between  networks  and  clusters  is  related  to  the  forms  of 
interaction. While the former are confined to networking, clusters embrace more sources of 
interaction.  Following  Edquist  (2004),  interaction  between  agents  may  either  occur  in 
competition,  transaction  or  networking  relations.  In  the  case  of  clusters,  Porter  (1998b) 
stresses the co-existence of competition and cooperation (labelled as ‘coopetition’), revealing 
of the cluster’s richness. 
In summary, clusters seem to heavily rely on networks as means of creating and exchanging 
knowledge, reducing uncertainty, accessing new markets/technologies and sharing risks. One 
can,  inclusively,  assume  cluster  structure  as  a  set  of  networks  that  promote  localized 
dynamics  and,  at  the  same  time,  guarantee  external  connections  with  other  relevant 
concentrations of knowledge and innovation.  
However clusters are not confined to networking. On the contrary, they are built around a 
critical  social  mass,  combining  specific  institutions  and  a  common  culture  (including 
language, values, norms, codes, etc.), which is eminently localized, that is, with spatial roots.
8 
                                                 
8 One straightforward and helpful exercise is listing well-known clusters like Silicon Valley (with electronics), 
Baden-Württemberg (with the automotive) or Emilia-Romagna (with textiles and fashion) and emerging clusters 
like North Jutland (with ICT’s) and California (with Biotech). The consideration of a cluster reports immediately 
to a specific region or location.   16 
 
Figure 1: Clusters through the lens of networks 
Figure 1 represents schematically the relationship between clusters and networks. Concretely, 
it  reveals  the  importance  of  networks  for  clusters  dynamics  at  two  levels:  internally  by 
guaranteeing  the  communication  of  different  but  related  economic  agents;  externally  by 
maintaining contact with other dispersed centres of knowledge and innovation. It therefore 
recognises the existence of networks, both distantly and in proximity. Moreover, the figure 
also stresses the elements characterising clusters. The spatial proximity is represented by the 
close environment of the cluster; interrelatedness of activities is stressed by the indication of 
firms  belonging  to  different  businesses,  including  suppliers,  interaction  between  agents 
appears  in  the  form  of  networks,  and  the  institutional  endowment  is  typified  by  the 
enumeration of some localised institutions.   17 
4. Conclusion 
Clusters  report  to  several  dimensions  -  geographical,  social,  and  political  -  of  economic 
activity, that have been subject of enquiry for decades. Spatial proximity, interrelatedness of 
capabilities/activities,  interaction  between  agents  and  institutional  endowment  are  key 
elements of clusters.  
Albeit  the  consensus  in  the  literature  about  the  relevance  of  networks  for  clusters 
development and success, the exact contents of both networks and clusters and their analytic 
relationship are far from being clear.  
On one hand, one should mention the few signs of communication between the vast, but 
distinct, bodies of literature that study either networks or clusters. On the other hand, all the 
literature does not seem to be very clear in terms of the boundaries between network and 
cluster meanings. In this context, it was possible to conclude that: 
Networks are a necessary but not sufficient condition of clusters existence and performance. 
Therefore, whereas clusters imply the existence of networks, the opposite is not necessarily 
true. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  clusters  seem  to  heavily  rely on  networks  as  means  of  creating  and 
exchanging  knowledge,  reducing  uncertainty,  accessing  new  markets/technologies  and 
sharing risks. One can, inclusively, assume cluster structure as a set of networks that promote 
localized dynamics and, at the same time, guarantee external connections with other relevant 
concentrations  of  knowledge  and  innovation.  However,  clusters  are  not  confined  to 
networking. On the contrary, they are built around a critical social mass, combining specific 
institutions and a common culture (including language, values, norms, codes, etc.), which is 
eminently localized, that is, with spatial roots. Networks, in turn, are not necessarily bounded 
by geographical proximity. 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned remarks we demonstrate in this paper that scrutinizing 
the  network  elements  involved  in  clusters  contributes  to  a  more  rigorous,  dynamic  and 
complex definition of the later. As such, we define cluster as 
Spatial configurations of economic activity, which articulate a wide range of economic agents 
who  interact  in  proximity.  This  combination  of  capabilities  operates  under  a  peculiar 
institutional frame, which is seen as promoting local competitive advantage, innovation and 
growth.   18 
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5 6 6 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 %￿
￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿’ ￿￿’ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿, ￿8￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ( ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿
￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 - ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿8 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ) ’ ￿/ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿
: ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿2 3 4 4  
5 6 6 7 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿# ’ ￿< ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿.’ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ ’ ￿# ’ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 3 ￿
￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿,# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿.￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿8￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿
> ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
> ￿ ? ￿￿( ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿# ￿￿￿￿ ? ￿< ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ! ( ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿= ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿@ * A ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ; ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ "￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿; ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ %￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ￿( ’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿& ’ ￿# ’ ￿( ’ ￿) ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ - ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿,# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
= ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿A # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ * 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿! * ￿= ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿& ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 7 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ) ’ ￿/ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿< ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿8￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿, ￿8￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿> ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
< ￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ %￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ * ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ - ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿"￿ ￿￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿* ￿￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿: ￿& ￿￿￿ B ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿ C D ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿ ￿E ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿# ￿ ￿F ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿B ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿@ ￿ * ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
) ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ) ’ ￿/ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿G ￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿# ￿ 1 * ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ) ’ ￿/ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿: ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿H￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" . ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ 1 * ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ * 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ’ ( ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
# ￿ 1 * ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿"￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ 1 * ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7  ￿
) ￿ ￿"￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ 1 * ￿ "9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 7 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿ ￿￿ ￿I￿, ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ D ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿C 3 ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* 0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ : ￿D ￿ : ￿ : ￿,￿￿ 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ * E ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
< ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿& ’ # ’ ( ’ ￿) ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿,# ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ ￿# ’ ￿< ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿.’ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 %￿
￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿8 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ # " & * ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 - ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿8￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿> ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ A ￿￿￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿< ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 3 ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ F ￿￿ ￿ * 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ * 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿8￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿8￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿
@ ￿ * ; $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿ + ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿G￿ ￿ ￿ H￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿8￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿